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Scholars and practitioners in communications law and the First
Amendment will recognize Lee Bollinger’s status as our most preeminent
and thoughtful writer on press freedom. His latest effort, Uninhibited,
Robust, and Wide-Open: A Free Press for a New Century,1 is a slim,
elegant, and forceful piece of advocacy, taking its title from the most
celebrated line in First Amendment jurisprudence,2 and perhaps in all of
* Associate, Covington & Burling LLP. The Author practices in the areas of
communications and media law and international freedom of expression, which involves
representing media companies and domestic and international NGOs working on press
issues around the world. The views expressed here are the Author’s alone. The Author
would like to thank President Bollinger for helping him and countless others to better
articulate the reasons we need a free press, as well as the tools we have to protect it.
1. LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A
NEW CENTURY 162–63 (2010).
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[W]e consider this
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constitutional law.3 In the book, Bollinger turns his focus to international
law, and on how “[t]o project a U.S. free press system onto the world,” 4 so
as “to create a global system of a free press for the emerging global
society.”5 In broad strokes, Bollinger offers a compelling argument for the
need for universal free press principles in the era of globalization, as well
as the means by which to achieve them. But in his argument’s particulars,
Bollinger presents an incomplete analysis and an overriding irony. The
incompleteness is in his failure to discuss a number of areas in which other
countries’ conceptions of the press are irreconcilable with our own, or how
to resolve these differences. And the irony is that many of the measures
Bollinger proposes that other countries take in adopting First Amendment
values would themselves likely not survive First Amendment scrutiny here
in the United States.
Part I of this Review will briefly describe Bollinger’s project, as well
as his discussion of the First Amendment values that animate his vision of a
global free press. Part II will raise some implementation problems
associated with exporting the United States’ free press system that
Bollinger fails to give their needed airing. Part III will discuss how
comfortably Bollinger’s project rests with a vision of the First Amendment
most recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the 2010
decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission6—a vision that
attaches constitutional importance to speech in its own right rather than to
the values speech might serve, and that is agnostic as to a speaker’s identity
or the content of the speaker’s message.7 Part IV concludes with a realworld example that demonstrates some of the practical difficulties
case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . .”) (emphasis added).
3. Ronald K.L. Collins, First Amendment Ctr., New York Times v. Sullivan: The Case
That
Changed
First
Amendment
History,
FREEDOM
F.,
http://catalog.freedomforum.org/SpecialTopics/NYTSullivan/summary.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
4. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 162–63.
5. Id. at 112.
6. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
7. As discussed more fully below, my use of the term “agnosticism” in discussing the
Speech and Press Clauses intends to signify an interpretive principle that disavows the
determinability of a particular “truth.” More simply, it values speech for its own sake, rather
than for what that speech might say, who might be speaking, or the effects that speech may
have on other speakers or listeners. I know the term is primarily used in religious philosophy
to describe an individual who does not take a position as to the existence of a deity, or (more
precisely) who believes there is a lack of sufficient proof to lead her to a conclusion on the
matter. It has also been used to describe the Constitution. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Our
Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120 (2008). For a use of the term that is closer to
mine, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 392.
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identified in this Review.

I. “PROVIDING THE WORLD” A FREE AND INDEPENDENT PRESS
Bollinger begins Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open by establishing
three “pillars” of First Amendment jurisprudence—press protection from
censorship, no special press rights of access, and press regulation—that
shape and support the freedoms the press enjoys in the United States
today.8 As to protection from censorship, Bollinger describes how the
Supreme Court’s initial First Amendment cases addressed, at first
“inauspicious[ly]” but then correctly, the problem of speech that advocated
illegal action, caused reputational harm, invaded privacy, potentially
prejudiced jurors, or divulged state secrets.9 These cases collectively stand
for the proposition that the First Amendment, “underscored by a passion
for a largely unbounded national forum,” protects a broad range of speech,
including speech by the institutional press.10 The second pillar, in
Bollinger’s view, represents a more lamentable line of cases—those that
deny the press’s newsgathering activity any special constitutional
protection.11 Accordingly, for example, there is no First Amendment right
protecting the disclosure of a journalist’s confidential source or mandating
access to a crime scene.12 Finally, the third pillar, “[r]egulating the [p]ress
to [i]mprove the [p]ress,”13 affirms the authority of the FCC to impose
limits on broadcaster speech and media ownership, protects public
broadcasters’ speech rights despite their receipt of government subsidies,
and declines to qualify the First Amendment rights of Internet speakers.14
Turning to the rest of the world, Bollinger next argues that as
globalization speeds on and the American press enters the global arena, it
will be subject to a number of legal regimes that are well outside of the
three pillars’ protection. Lese majesté laws that criminalize insults of royal
family members and heads of state, overprotective or nonexistent access to
information laws, website-censoring authoritarian regimes, and
“bureaucratic licensing rules” that bar or frustrate foreign correspondents
and media outlets all inhibit the free flow of information upon which we
have become increasingly dependent in the Internet era.15 Bollinger
8. See BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 12–43 (deriving the three “pillars” from Supreme
Court cases).
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 24.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 25–27 (quotation omitted).
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 29–42.
15. Id. at 89 (citing Jane Macartney, Time Out Magazine Banned by China’s Censors in
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therefore proposes the need for “a central, overriding system of
constitutional protections” “to provide a free and independent press to a
world in desperate need of such an institution . . . .”16
To implement this system, Bollinger calls on the U.S. Supreme Court
to lead in the formation of a global free press by “draw[ing] on the
language and concepts in current international conventions and laws,”17
such as freedom-of-expression-affirming provisions in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and similar agreements.18 Doing so would
establish freedom of expression not as a legal right granted by sovereignty,
but rather a natural “right of individual citizens throughout the world.”19 He
also calls for a number of other steps the United States should take in
“nurtur[ing] a press focused on broader global issues,”20 such as using
public funds to develop a “nationally sponsored media” similar to the BBC
in its focus on international reporting.21 Finally, he explores the potential
use of contractual relationships between nations, as manifested in
international trade and investment law, to enforce global norms for a free
press.22 By taking these actions, Bollinger claims, the United States can
lead in developing increased protections for journalists and speakers
worldwide, thus setting off a rising tide of freedom of expression that will
lift all boats.

II. THE “FREE PRESS” AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Bollinger acknowledges that there are a number of implementation
problems associated with developing an uninhibited global marketplace of
ideas. Most of these problems stem from the disparate levels of protection
afforded to the press for its speech here in the United States and abroad.
For example, Bollinger mentions the problem of libel tourism, where
defamation plaintiffs seek redress against authors and journalists in
jurisdictions such as England, where the burden is on the writer to show
truth rather than on the plaintiff to show falsity, as is the case in the United
States.23 For obvious reasons, Internet publishing has become a boon to
libel plaintiffs. Fortunately, however, domestic courts have refused to apply
Run Up to Olympics, TIMESONLINE
(June 11, 2008),
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4113093.ece).
16. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 105.
17. Id. at 118.
18. Id. at 118–19.
19. Id. at 119.
20. Id. at 131.
21. Id. at 134.
22. Id. at 145–153.
23. Id. at 96–97.

available
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the law of these countries or enforce their judgments, finding them
inconsistent with the First Amendment. In Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publications Inc., for example, a New York state trial court held that
England’s lack of a First Amendment equivalent meant that “[t]he
protection to free speech and the press embodied in that amendment would
be seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments granted
pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered
antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution.”24
But Britain has shown some interest in statutory fixes to its libel regime
that would raise plaintiffs’ burden of proof and create a speech-protective
qualified public interest privilege.25 Additionally, over the past ten years,
many countries have decriminalized libel, or at least removed the prospect
of imprisonment for publication crimes.26 So, in this sense, the United
States’ more protective model of speech rights is already taking hold, or at
least being considered, in other parts of the world.
But there are other areas where the incompatibility between other
countries’ conceptions of a free press and our own is far more intractable,
in part because the same justifications—or “pillars”—lead other countries
to draw opposite conclusions than those reached here in the United States.
24. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. County Sup.
Ct. 1992); see also Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 2005 (refusing to enforce a French libel judgment that was “incompatible” with
the First Amendment); Ellis v. Time, Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-1755, 1997 WL 863267, at *13
(D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1997) (prohibiting application of British libel law); Matusevitch v.
Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995) (declining to enforce British libel judgment);
Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2515 (LLS), 1994 WL 419847, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994 (finding that “establishment of a claim under the British law of
defamation would be antithetical to the First Amendment protections accorded the
defendants”).
25. See, e.g., Libel Law: Improving a Reputation, THE ECONOMIST (May 27, 2010),
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16219883. The proposed bill, introduced in
May of 2010 by Lord Anthony Lester in the House of Lords, can be found at Defamation
Bill,
2010–11,
H.L.
Bill
[55]
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldbills/003/11003.1-7.html#j01.
26. Countries that have decriminalized defamation in the past decade include Ukraine
(2001), Ghana (2001), Sri Lanka (2002), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999), Georgia (2004),
Moldova (2004), Ireland (2009), Romania (2009), and the United Kingdom (2009). See,
e.g., ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., LIBEL AND INSULT LAWS: A MATRIX ON
WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE 34, 63, 107, 165 (2005);
Helsinki Comm’n Hearing on the Threats to Free Media in the OSCE Region, 6 (June 9,
2010) (statement of Dunja Mijatovic, Rep. on Freedom of the Media, Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe), http://www.osce.org/fom/68432; Alexis Arieff,
Senegal: Freedom … With Limits, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jun. 6, 2005),
http://www.cpj.org/reports/2005/06/senegal-05.php; Indian Government Takes First Step
Toward Decriminalizing Defamation, GLOBAL JOURNALIST (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://www.globaljournalist.org/worldwatch/2011/02/india/indian-government-takes-firststep-toward-decriminalizing-defamation/.
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For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has found rights of reply in the print
context to be facially incompatible with the First Amendment. In Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court,
noted that “implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of
access”—particularly because it required “governmental coercion” for its
implementation—“at once brings about a confrontation with the express
provisions of the First Amendment” and could not be reconciled with the
guarantee of a free press.27 But nearly every democracy outside of the
United States grants story subjects either a constitutional or statutory
right—implemented by “government coercion” (and by “government
coercion” I mean only law, just as the Tornillo Court meant it)—to reply to
print stories written about them.28 So too does the American Convention on
Human Rights, an international human rights instrument which Bollinger
advocates the United States should ratify.29 In addition, tribunals applying
the international freedom of expression law upon which Bollinger seeks to
rely have read a right of reply into nominally press-protective agreements
such as the European Convention on Human Rights.30 According to these
tribunals, one justification for doing so is that a right of reply ensures a
diversity of opinion on matters of public interest.31
There are other examples. Even though the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights found the licensing of journalists to be incompatible with
freedom of expression back in 1985, a number of countries in the world,
including a few countries that have submitted to that court’s jurisdiction,
impose some form of licensing regime for domestic or foreign journalists,
newspapers, or the importation of books and films.32 So too do some of the
international conventions Bollinger characterizes as speech-protective.33
Foreign investment in media outlets is not nearly as universal a free-press
principle as Bollinger describes; he bemoans limitations India has placed
on ownership stakes in its newspapers as limiting the free flow of
27. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974).
28. See, e.g., Kyu Ho Youm, The Right of Reply and Freedom of the Press: An
International and Comparative Perspective, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1017, 1018–20 (2008).
29. American Convention on Human Rights art. 14, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
9 I.L.M. 99; see also BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 143.
30. See, e.g., Melnychuk v. Ukraine, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 6–7.
31. Id. at 7; see also Ediciones Tiempo S.A. v. Spain, App. No. 13010/87, 62 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247, 254 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Mark Fitzgerald, Latin America Continues to ‘License’ Journalists,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER (Jan. 12, 2004), http://www.editorandpublisher.com/Headlines/latinamerica-continues-to-license-journalists-58922-.aspx.
33. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights allows for licensing of
“cinema enterprises.” See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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information across borders, for example, without acknowledging that the
United States imposes similar limitations in the broadcast sector.34 These
are difficult problems. By failing to address them, Bollinger’s roadmap for
implementing a worldwide First Amendment takes a view from too high a
level.
Given that these compatibility issues are mostly ones of sovereignty,
Bollinger naturally must rely for the most part on judges’ interpretation of
law, rather than on legislatures’ promulgation or on executives’
implementation of it. After all, the Third Soviet Constitution of the
U.S.S.R. included not only the right to “freedom of speech [and] of the
press,” but also the right to “develop[] television and radio, . . . book
publishing and periodic press.”35 But how can press-protective principles
be “imported,” as Bollinger calls it, by other jurisdictions and adopted as
rules of decision in their own courts? Will it be through the
“encouragement” Bollinger believes will come if the United States subjects
itself to the “international oversight” of human rights law?36 Bollinger
recognizes the enforceability problems with international instruments such
as Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which
state a right to “seek,” “receive,” and “impart” information.37 He declines
to mention, however, that the ICCPR seems to not serve as much of a
deterrent to countries like Egypt, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, and Somalia,
which have been parties to the Covenant for decades and have been jailing
journalists for almost as long.38 If some countries continue to repress the
press despite their status as parties to Article 19, it is difficult to see why
they would act any differently in the face of encouragement from the
United States, let alone follow its example.39
34. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 89–90; 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1996) (forbidding the grant of
station licenses to various foreign entities or domestic corporations with substantial foreign
ownership).
35. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] arts. 50, 46.
36. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 144.
37. Id. at 118–19.
NEWS,
38. See,
e.g.,
Egypt
Journalists
Get
Jail
Terms,
BBC
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5118876.stm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011); Louise Hallman,
Venezuelan Journalist Fined, Jailed and Banned from Working, After Accusing Mayor of
Nepotism, INT’L PRESS INST. (June 18, 2010), http://www.freemedia.at/singleview/4999/;
Two Journalists Get Long Jail Terms in Human Rights Crackdown, REPORTERS WITHOUT
BORDERS
(Aug.
25,
2006),
http://arabia.reporters-sansfrontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=18660; Somali Journalist Jailed for Airing Interview,
RTÉ NEWS, http://www.rte.ie/news/2010/0814/somalia.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
39. Bollinger also calls for the Supreme Court to “develop a broader newsgathering
right in the context of international or global government actions.” BOLLINGER, supra note
1, at 125. But he gives no insight as to how such a right would be defined or enforced. To
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III. EXPORTING THE AGNOSTIC FIRST AMENDMENT
At its core, Bollinger’s project is one of international law, and it
should be judged as such. But the project’s animating principle is a
particular vision of the First Amendment’s protection of the press. It is thus
worthwhile to consider whether the current First Amendment can support
the weight Bollinger asks it to bear. The Supreme Court’s most robust
discussion of the First Amendment’s application to the media in recent
years—and the most definitive declaration of First Amendment principles
by the Roberts Court—came in a campaign finance case, last term’s
Citizens United. Like the examples discussed above, the case implies some
incompatibility between the First Amendment’s present meaning and the
First Amendment Bollinger seeks to export to the rest of the world.
The statute at issue in Citizens United, which barred corporations and
unions from spending general treasury funds on a broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication mentioning a candidate within sixty days of a
general election or thirty days of a primary election, included an express
carve-out for media companies.40 In finding the statute unconstitutional, the
majority overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,41 which
upheld a Michigan state statute that prohibited corporations from using
treasury money to support or oppose candidates in elections because of
corporations’ potentially corruptive influence on elections, made possible
through the accumulation of wealth effectuated by the corporate form. As
support for rejecting Austin, both the majority and the concurrence noted
that under Austin’s theory of the First Amendment, large media
corporations enjoyed protection to speak about elections under the
statute—including endorsements—only as a matter of legislative grace.
Justice Kennedy, for example, stated that the rationale relied upon in Austin
“could ban political speech of media corporations,” and “wealthy media
corporations could have their voices diminished to put them on par with
other media entities.”42 In concurring, Chief Justice Roberts similarly
argued that the rationale would “apply most directly to newspapers and
other media corporations,” because “[t]hey have a more profound impact
take one example, Bollinger’s proposed right would seem to allow a U.S. journalist working
in Iraq to demand access to a meeting in Duhok between the U.S. Secretary of State and the
head of the Kurdish Regional Government. One wonders what court the journalist would go
to when the Diplomatic Security Service bars him from the meeting room, or what type of
relief the journalist would seek after being barred. In the end, even if speech is no longer
limited by borders, jurisdiction continues to be.
40. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (citing 2
U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006)).
41. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
42. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 905.
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on public discourse than most other speakers.”43
As a matter of Press Clause jurisprudence, however, the majority and
concurring Justices’ concerns about the media’s speech rights are red
herrings. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, Austin itself
distinguished media endorsements from speech-related expenditures by
other corporations.44 More importantly, however, in their rush to defend the
rights of the press, neither Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion nor the
Chief Justice’s concurrence makes any mention of the long line of
precedent that would find unconstitutional a statute barring press discussion
of election-related speech during the period leading up to a primary
election—a principle that Justice Kennedy himself recognized in Austin.45
A statute that sought to “ban political speech of media corporations”46 by,
for example, prohibiting newspapers or television stations from spending
funds to pay for endorsement-associated expenses would run afoul of the
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue47
and Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland48 line of cases, which would
find the statute had impermissible “censorial effects” that would “deter the
exercise of First Amendment rights.”49 Mills v. Alabama held that statutes
that do not single out the press but still have the effect of “punish[ing] a
newspaper editor for doing no more than publishing an editorial on election
day urging people to vote a particular way in the election” violate the First
Amendment,50 which directly refutes the concerns of the majority and
concurrence. A prosecution for violating any such “ban” would likely be
subjected to Sullivan’s actual malice standard for laws regarding speech
concerning public officials.51 In addition, the government’s attempts to
43. Id. at 923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
44. Id. at 976 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the Michigan statute at issue in Austin
included an exemption for media companies that the Court upheld against an equal
protection challenge. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666–68. It thus makes little sense to find that
Austin’s rationale would allow the prosecution of media companies for political speech
when Austin itself addressed and rejected the possibility.
45. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 712 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It is beyond peradventure
that the media could not be prohibited from speaking about candidate qualifications. The
First Amendment would not tolerate a law prohibiting a newspaper or television network
from spending on political comment because it operates through a corporation.”) (citing
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–20 (1966)) (emphasis added).
46. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 905.
47. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
48. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
49. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 588 (internal quotation omitted).
50. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218 (finding punishment of newspaper endorsement author under
Alabama Corrupt Practices Act violated First Amendment).
51. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67–75 (1964) (citing New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)) (discussing that the Constitution limits state
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enjoin a media outlet from making an endorsement prior to an election
pursuant to enforcing such a ban would be struck down as a prior
restraint.52
If these hypothetical prosecutions sound like they are far off from any
First Amendment world that you might recognize, it is because they are. By
exposing the press to harms it does not face and extending protections to
the press that it does not need, Citizens United’s high-spirited defense of
the institutional media is, in the end, mostly smoke and mirrors. But the
case does stand for a proposition that is relevant to Bollinger’s project: the
notion that the value of the First Amendment lies in its protection of the act
of speech, regardless of its content. This content agnosticism has its roots in
a number of Supreme Court Press Clause opinions, many of which
Bollinger identifies. Examples include Justice Brennan’s separate opinion
in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, which noted that even if the press were
“arrogant, tyrannical, abusive, and sensationalist, . . . the decision of what,
when, and how to publish is for editors, not judges,”53 and Justice
Douglas’s dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, in which he denounced the
“amazing position that First Amendment rights are to be balanced against
other needs or conveniences of government.”54
This agnosticism is in tension with another First Amendment value
that the Speech and Press Clauses have long been thought to serve and
upon which Bollinger heavily relies: the public’s right to know. In Pell v.
Procunier, for example, the Court found that reporters had no First
Amendment-based right to have face-to-face interviews with prison
inmates.55 Three Justices dissented, basing their disagreement not on the
reporter’s right to conduct the interview or even write the story, but rather
on the public’s right to read it: “[The prison’s ban on press interviews with
power to impose sanctions for speech concerning public officials to those statements made
with actual malice).
52. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). It also bears
mentioning that despite the Citizens United majority’s clarion call for press freedom, one
member seems unperturbed at the possibility of depriving the institutional press of its
previously recognized First Amendment rights. See, e.g., John W. Dean, Justice Scalia’s
Thoughts, and a Few of My Own, on New York Times v. Sullivan, FINDLAW (Dec. 2, 2005),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20051202.html (quoting Justice Scalia as implying that
New York Times v. Sullivan was wrongly decided). But to the degree Justice Scalia criticized
Sullivan for granting the press special privileges, the interpretation underlying his criticism
is inconsistent with his own opinions. See id. (quoting Scalia as stating “[t]he press is the
only business that is not held responsible for its negligence”); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 927–28 n.6 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
Press Clause protects printing, not the institutional press).
53. 427 U.S. 539, 613 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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inmates] is an unconstitutional infringement on the public’s right to know
protected by the free press guarantee of the First Amendment.”56 Relatedly,
Red Lion upheld the now-discarded Fairness Doctrine against a First
Amendment challenge from a broadcaster who claimed it infringed on his
speech rights.57 The Court rejected the broadcaster’s claim that the
Doctrine constituted forced speech, because in the scarce speech context of
radio, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.”58
Red Lion demonstrates the tension between a First Amendment theory
that values speakers and one that values the receipt of speech. If the value
of speech is in an uninhibited right to speak, then a listener’s right to
receive the speech will always be satisfied; this is so because the
fulfillment of the listener’s right is a result to be produced, rather than an
independent value that needs its own protection. If, on the other hand, a
speaker can be deemed to cause interference in some way with the greater
value of listeners’ receipt of speech, then the speaker’s right could
theoretically be diminished. To apply Citizens United’s agnostic theory to
an extreme case, constitutional values should be untroubled if a corporation
or union bought every available advertisement on every available
broadcasting station and newspaper in a particular market. The Citizens
United dissenters, however, would view this result as trampling on a
value—the public’s right to hear all sides of political debates—that the
First Amendment was intended to preserve. Another, more realistic,
example demonstrating the tension is the Fairness Doctrine. A First
Amendment agnostic would find the doctrine unconstitutional on its face
for its forcing of speech onto broadcasters, while a consequentialist like
Bollinger would balance the harms it causes in suppressing speech against
its benefits in facilitating the airing of many sides of a given issue. Indeed,
Bollinger expressly calls for the Fairness Doctrine’s return.59
56. Id. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
58. Id. at 390.
59. See BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 126. For a seeming rejection of the
consequentialist approach, see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).
(“[The First Amendment] does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a
judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs.”). The same Justices who decided Stevens by an 8–1 vote later split 5–4
in Citizens United. But there is little doubt that the Justices dissenting in Citizens United
engaged in an “ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” of corporate speech.
Id. Perhaps the Citizens United dissenters are more accurately described as fainthearted
agnostics who balance only when they view the First Amendment costs as sufficiently
significant.
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This tension is more than academic, especially for Bollinger’s project.
While Citizens United casts the majority of the current Supreme Court as
free speech agnostics, Bollinger is firmly entrenched in the consequentialist
camp. In setting out a “framework for how to think about the press . . . in
the twenty-first century,”60 he advocates requiring broadcasters “to sell
time” and “provide a certain amount” of free on-air time “to those wishing
to express their views about public issues” and requiring or encouraging
“broadcasters to cover international and global issues,” despite decades of
court and FCC precedent barring the imposition of such requirements.61 He
calls for significant, systematic public investment in media outlets,
including federal subsidies for foreign bureaus, and says courts should have
the power to force cable systems to carry foreign news channels such as Al
Jazeera in English.62 In addition, he argues that the First Amendment may
even “require” the government to disperse media ownership in the interest
of maintaining a free press,63 a position supported by a number of the
international judicial bodies with which Bollinger seeks affinity.64
Whether these policies would result in a demonstrably better or freer
media is beside the present point (though I have my doubts). What they
undoubtedly express, however, is a content preference, and a determination
on Bollinger’s part that some decisions as to what media cover should not
be left entirely to individual editorial discretion. Further, based on these
speech proscriptions in the name of a greater good, there is no reason to
believe Bollinger would find rights of reply incompatible with the First
Amendment values he seeks to export—in other words, Bollinger would
seem to think that Tornillo was wrongly decided.65 One therefore cannot
60. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 115.
61. Id. at 128–29; see FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 585 (1981)
(upholding the FCC’s policy statement in which it concluded that FCC review of program
formats does not serve the public interest); Univision Comm. Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5842, para. 28 (2007) (“[With rare exception,] licensees are
afforded broad discretion in the scheduling, selection and presentation of programs aired on
their stations, and the Commission will not substitute its judgment for that of the station
regarding programming matters.”).
62. See BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 130–37.
63. Id. at 60.
64. See, e.g., Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria, 276 Eur. Ct. H.R. 6, ¶¶ 38–44
(1993); see also Written Comments of the Open Society Justice Initiative at ¶¶ 4–13, 17–31,
Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. v. Italy, App. No. 38433/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (March 2010) (quoting a
number of European court decisions holding, inter alia, that “state regulation will likely
continue to be constitutionally required to safeguard pluralism of viewpoints and freedom of
broadcasting”).
65. Bollinger reconciles Red Lion and Tornillo in Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open
and elsewhere by arguing that “under the First Amendment it is not necessary that all
communication technologies be structured identically, that there are merits to having
multiple approaches to a vigorous press, and that having multiple approaches yields benefits
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help but wonder if Bollinger’s actual vision of the First Amendment, at
least in part, is that of a Western European consequentialist rather than of
an American agnostic, which is an odd mindset for a Press Clause exporter.

IV. CONCLUSION
I end with an anecdote that I believe demonstrates the difficulties of
implementing Bollinger’s vision in the way he suggests. In February 2007,
I represented a team of media scholars and practitioners working on a press
reform project in Rwanda, where fifteen years earlier media outlets had
facilitated and encouraged genocide, first by spreading divisionist ideology
and then by reading out the names and hiding places of Tutsis who were
taking cover from machete-wielding Hutu genocidaires.66
The draft media law my colleagues and I had reviewed as part of this
reform project contained a number of expression-unfriendly measures,
including a licensing requirement for journalists. Like any good free speech
advocate, I told the regulators, legislators, and cabinet members with whom
I met that such a requirement was inimical to freedom of expression. One
minister listened, politely waited for me to finish, and responded to my
soliloquy with a question.
“Is it correct that your country requires you, as an attorney, to be
licensed?”
“Yes,” I replied.
“And what of doctors? Are they required to be licensed as well?”
“Yes,” I responded again. Like any able attorney, I attempted to parry
the minister’s point with a distinction. “But I need licensure as an attorney,
because if I make a mistake, someone can lose money or be imprisoned.
And a doctor needs licensure because if he makes a mistake, someone
could die.”
“And what is the difference between your American doctor and a
Rwandan journalist?”
The minister’s attempt at enlightenment did not trigger in me a full
consequentialist conversion, and subsequent actions by the Rwandan
government have demonstrated that self-preservation, more than national
of experimentation . . . .” BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 129. See generally LEE C.
BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1997). In addition to being a classically
consequentialist statement, it is difficult to see how the press can take much comfort in a
First Amendment that follows “multiple approaches.”
66. For more information on the Rwandan genocide and the media’s role in it, see
generally THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (Allan Thompson ed., 2007). For more
information on the Rwandan Media Reform Project, see We Wish to Inform You, ON THE
MEDIA
(Mar.
23,
2007),
http://www.onthemedia.org
/transcripts/2007/03/23/04 (click on “Download MP3” or press the “Play” icon).
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security, may explain the motivation behind its suppression of the press.67
But his argument demonstrates that media law, like any other body of law,
is a product of context, and efforts to reform it in individual countries must
take that context into account. Press protection in the United States can be a
beacon in completing that important work, but it cannot be the sole
yardstick against which those countries’ efforts will be measured.
Even if Bollinger’s prescriptions for a global free press are in the end
not fully formed or argued, he performs a great service by articulating the
links between a free press, democratic stability, and self-fulfillment, and by
placing these links alongside those interconnecting the modern world.
Freedom of information, as he notes, is not only “the key to securing other
rights and to serving other ends”—it also both “prevent[s] the worst of
human tragedies . . . and . . . make[s] the most of human relationships.”68
This is so because, as Bollinger demonstrates, “in general people behave
better when they know more.”69 Bollinger’s sanguine and insightful book
reminds us that even in today’s vast, differentiated, but interconnected
world, liberty, stability, and democracy ride in on the front pages of
newspapers, over the broadcast airwaves, and across the network of the
Internet—and not on the backs of bombs.

67. See, e.g., Rwanda Shuts Critical Papers in Run-up to Presidential Vote, COMMITTEE
PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://cpj.org/2010/04/rwanda-shuts-criticalpapers-in-run-up-to-presiden.php.
68. BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 113, 115.
69. Id. at 113.
TO

